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BUILDING AN APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FROM BOARD
OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY: RAZING THE DOOR
AND RAISING THE FLOOR
PERRY

A. ZIRKEL*

In recent years special education' has been one of the most active
areas of litigation in school law.2 This activity has been based in large
part on the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA or Act),3 which has been described by contemporaneous
commentators in effusively expansive terms.4 In the years immediately
preceding5 and succeeding 6 the Act, lower court decisions focused not
on the substantive quality of education that handicapped children
ought to receive, but rather on the fact that an estimated 1.75 million
handicapped youngsters were excluded from any educational facilities
7
at all. These decisions required the state to provide these unserved
* Professor, School of Education, Lehigh University; B.A., 1966, State University of
New York at Oswego; M.A., 1968, University of Connecticut; Ph.D., 1972, University of
Connecticut; J.D., 1976, University of Connecticut; L.L.M., 1983, Yale University. The author acknowledges with appreciation the reviews of an earlier draft of this article by Michael
A. Rebell, partner in the New York City law firm of Rebell & Krieger, and John L. Pottenger, Jr., supervising attorney of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of Yale
Law School. The stimulus for this research was a child advocacy seminar coordinated by
Yale's Director of Clinical Studies, Stephen Wizner.
1. For historical information on the law of the handicapped, see, e.g., R. BURGDORF,
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS (1980); Note, HistoricalOverview: From
Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 953 (1977).
2. See general, T. MARVELL, A. GALFO & J. ROCKWELL, STUDENT LITIGATION: A
COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF CIVIL CASES INVOLVING STUDENTS

1977-1981 (1981).

3. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1976 and Supp. V 1982)).
4. See, e.g., Contemporary Studies Project, Special Education: The Strugglefor Equal
Educational Opportunities in Iowa, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1283, 1337-38 (1977); Comment, The
Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975.- A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 717, 719 (1978).
5. The two major cases, whose principles were expressly incorporated in the legislative
history of the EAHCA, were Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343
F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (PARC), and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972). See infra note 130; S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1975). In the
years immediately preceding the Act, more than thirty court decisions also acknowledged
the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education. Id. at 7.
6. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd, 557 F.2d
373 (3d Cir. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976); Fialkowski v.
Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
7. The 1974-75 estimates of 1.75 million handicapped children receiving no educational services and 2.5 million handicapped children receiving inappropriate education were
repeated throughout the legislative hearings for the EAHCA. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th

19831

BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY

youngsters with access to school by means of procedural relief, such as
due process hearings. The "second generation"' of court decisions represented a transition to substantive questions,9 such as the quality of
education to which the estimated 2.5 million handicapped youngsters
receiving inappropriate educational services' 0 are entitled.
In Board of Education v. Rowley," its first case to interpret any
provision of the EAHCA, l2 the Supreme Court addressed the meaning
of "free appropriatepublic education" (FAPE)I3 in relation to a bright,
high achieving deaf child. Rejecting the more rigorous standard that
Cong. 1st Sess. 8 (1975), cited in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3045-46 & 3046
n.19 (1982).
A more recent report estimated that 4.2 million children (8.5% of the school age
population) are receiving a special education and that the two priorities of the EAHCA (1)providing special education to the unserved and (2) providing it to the most severely
handicapped among the underserved - have been realized. See EHLR Special Report:
GAO Report, 3 EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED LAW REPORT [EHLR] (CRR) ACIO
(Supp.60 Nov. 13, 1981).
8. Rebell, Implementation of Court Mandates Concerning Special Education: The
Problems and the Potential, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 335, 346 (1981). This term, borrowed from
desegregation litigation, covers a broad range of cases. Rebell used it to include Jose P. v.
Ambach, id. at 346, which stems from exclusion and focuses on procedure. At the other
edge of this broad category are cases dealing with the limits of residential placements and
related services. See, e.g., Mooney & Aronson, Solomon Revisited"Separating Educational
and Other Than EducationalNeeds in Special Education ResidentialPlacements, 14 CONN.L.
REV.531 (1982); Note, ResidentialPlacement of HandicappedChildren. Altering the Scope of
a Public Education, 43 U. PiTr.L. REv. 789 (1982).
9. "Substance" and "procedure" are inevitably overlapping terms, and - as the participants in these cases have noted - the courts are more comfortable dealing with the
Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education:t EmpiricalStudies
latter. See, e.g.,
andProceduralProposals, 62 CAL.L. REV.40, 81 (1974).
10. See supra note 7.
11. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
12. Id. at 3041.
For recent Supreme Court decisions involving handicapped persons within other
institutional contexts and statutory schemes, see Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979) (college's refusal to admit a deaf student to a nursing program does not
violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390 (1981) (found moot whether a university must provide a sign language interpreter for
deaf students under § 504 but remanded on damages issue); Pennhurst State School and
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1982) (the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act did not create in favor of the mentally retarded any substantive right to appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979) (both
upholding constitutionality of state statutes that provided for involuntary commitment of
children under 18 to hospitals by their parents without a hearing); Youngberg v. Romeo, 102
S. Ct. 2452 (1982) (involuntarily committed mentally retarded person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and

freedom from undue restraint).
13. 20 U.S.C § 1412(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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had been enunciated by the lower courts in this case, 14 the Supreme
Court ruled that appropriateness under the Act requires "providing
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the
child to benefit from that instruction."' 5 Finding that Amy Rowley's
individualized educational program (IEP) met this standard, the Court
reversed the lower court's judgment that had provided her with a fulltime sign language interpreter in her classroom.
The Rowley decision, coming on the heels of Supreme Court decisions generally adverse to the rights of the handicapped,' 6 appears at
first glance to present a potential for mischief. Although the reaction of
many commentators has been noticeably mild, and even reassuring,' 7
their response may be more reflective of a desire to avoid lending credibility to an adverse reading of the case. In any event, some advocates
of handicapped children have viewed the opinion as a significant step
backwards.' 8 One need not look too far into the court and hearing
officer decisions since Rowley to find support for this view.
For example, in a case decided one month after Rowley, a state
court sympathized with the four-year fight of a 16-year-old profoundly
deaf student for a change in his program, but rejected his claim, stating:
"Frankly, the majority decision in Rowley is devastating to the Petitioner's position and it is that decision which this court is required to
follow."' 9 Similarly, at the hearing officer level, parental objections to
an IEP for a mildly handicapped child were rather summarily rejected
with citation to Rowley.2 0 Signs in the allied areas of federal funding2 '
14. See infra text accompanying notes 57 and 59.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 3049. See infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Rowley opinion.
16. See supra note 12. Romeo was not a major step forward because the Court abstained from according a general constitutional right to training per se, adopting instead a
limited review standard, deferential to the professional judgment of institutional authorities.
102 S.Ct. at 2459, 2461-62.
17. See, e.g., Oberman, EHLR Analysis: EHlA and the Courts in 1981-82-A Shft in
Focus, 3 EHLR (CRR) AC4 (Supp. 79 Sept. 3, 1982); Stotland & Mancuso, EHLRAnalysis:
The Aftermath of Rowley Business as Usual, 3 EHLR (CRR) AC159 (Supp. 76 July 23,
1982).
18. See, e.g., Anthony, A Critiqueof Rowley by a Special Educator, 6 EDUc. L. REp. 867,
870 (1982); EHLR Analysis. What Rowley Means, 3 EHLR (CRR) SA29, SA29 (Supp. 84
Nov. 12, 1982).
19. Frank v. Grover, No. 81 CV 6003 (Wis. Cir. Ct. July 30, 1982), reprintedin 3 EHLR
(CRR) 554:148 (Supp. 82 Oct. 15, 1982); cf. Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 693
F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1982),peaitionforcert.fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1983)(No.
82-1292) ("the act does not require ... the best possible option"); Monahan v. Nebraska,
687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Rowley as construing EAHCA to "impose a
substantive duty ... only to afford an adequate education").
20. In re Pasadena Indep. School Dist., No. 014-981 (Nov. 5, 1982), reprintedin 3 EHLR
(CRR) 504:236 (1982).
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and regulations2 2 also seem at least potentially to point backwards.
Upon closer examination, however, Rowley represents no more
than a limited loss, leaving ample room and providing footholds for
further advances in the educational reform movement on behalf of
handicapped youngsters. This Article argues that the Rowley decision,
properly understood, does not necessarily erode the legal rights of the
handicapped. Part I summarizes the EAHCA and lower court interpretations of FAPE. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court and lower
court decisions in Rowley. Part III advances the arguments that Rowley
represents a notably narrow decision and that ambiguity and latency in
the opinion provide room for rigor in the substantive2 3 interpretation of
"appropriate education." Part IV predicts an upswing in activity stemming from alternative legal bases, particularly in the area of state statutes. The underlying thesis of this Article is that the foray into the
substantive area is necessary,24 but that the bewildering variation
among the handicapped 5 and the infant state of the art of special edu21. See, e.g., Weicker, The Needfor a Strong EducationforAll HandicappedChildren's
Act, 14 CONN. L. REV. 471, 472 (1982).
22. The Reagan Administration recently announced that it had abandoned, at least temporarily, its controversial attempt to revise the EAHCA's Regulations. The announcement
cited judicial developments limiting the EAHCA's interpretation as one reason why. Educ.
Week, Mar. 30, 1983, at 10, col. 2. Nevertheless, some handicapped-rights advocates claim
that the Administration is already reneging on its promise. Educ. Week, May 4, 1983, at 10,
col. 2.
23. This Article does not focus on procedural aspects of the Rowley decison, although its
emphasis on compliance with the procedural requirements of the EAHCA can serve as an
alternate avenue for special education suits. See, e.g., Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545
F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982); Appel v. Ambach, No. 78 Civ. 2892 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1982),
reprintedin 3 EHLR 554:236 (1982) (remanded for failure to provide IEP). See also infra
notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
24. Limits of the power of the procedural approach in this area are pointed out by both
observers and participants. See, e.g., Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 9, at 77; see generally
Weatherley & Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucratsand InstitutionalInnovation.: Implementing
Special-EducationReform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 171 (1977).
Although the concern with judicially discoverable and manageable standards is a
cautionary one, the courts cannot use it as an excuse to avoid sensitive and complex issues.
See Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D. Ala. 1981);
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969).
25. Several commentators have pointed out the definitional complexity and variety of
handicapping conditions in terms of such variables as source, severity, and kind. See, e.g.,
Finn, Advocating For The Most MisunderstoodMinority.- Securing Compliance With Special
Education Laws, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 505, 514-15 n.65 (1980); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff,
supra note 9, at 41. This point was at least alluded to in the legislative history of the Act.
See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 23,707 (1975). A common error in the legal literature is focusing
on one type of handicap and generalizing a standard therefrom. See, e.g., Handel, The Role
ofthe Advocate in Securing the HandicappedChild'sRight to an Effective MinimalEducation.
36 OHIo ST. L.J. 349 (1975) (the mentally retarded).
A related problem is conceiving of the handicapped in terms of the physical stereotype (e.g., wheelchair bound), and ignoring the more slippery categories of learning disabled
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cation6 defy a single substantive standard and require instead experimentation, variation, and evolution of a multifactor concept of
appropriateness.
I.

STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL BACKDROP

A.

The EAHCA

The Education for All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975 is primarily funding legislation, with comprehensive regulatory conditions
attached to a state's acceptance of supplementary federal fiscal assistance. The three key technical terms in the Act are "free and appropriate public education" (FAPE), "least restrictive environment" (LRE),
and "individualized education program" (IEP).27
The primary purpose of the Act is "to assure that all handicapped
children have available to them. . a [FAPE]."2 8 This term is cryptically defined as:
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary,
or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program
29

To qualify for assistance, a state must have in effect approved policies,
plans, and procedures that assure all handicapped children the right to
(LD) and emotionally disturbed (ED) students. Nationally, LD is the largest category, constituting an oversubscribed 36% of the handicapped school population. See GAO Report,
supra note 7, at AC 10. ED students comprise 8.4% of the handicapped school population.
See J. KNrrZER, UNCLAIMED CHILDREN 139 (1982). The complexity is compounded in
terms of multihandicapped students, and those who - not far from Amy Rowley - are
gifted as well as singly or multiply handicapped. See infra note 55.
26. See, e.g., Halligan, The Function of Schools, the Status of Teachers, andthe Claims of
the Handicapped"An Inquiry into Special Education Malpractice, 45 Mo. L. REv. 667, 681
(1980); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 9, at 47, 50.
27. This summary of the Act is purposely selective and skeletal. More detailed analyses
of the Act are readily available. See, e.g., Colley, Education/orAl HandicappedChildren
Act (EH.4) .4 Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 137 (1981); Comment, supra
note 4.
Extensive regulations have been adopted pursuant to the Act. See 34 C.F.R. § 300
(1982).

28. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1982).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). The accompanying definition of special education fo-

cuses on "meetfing] the unique needs of a handicapped child," whereas that for "related
services" is rooted in "assist[ing] a handicapped child to benefit from special education." Id

§ 1401 (16), (17).
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a FAPE.3 ° "Handicapped children" is defined broadly to include
"mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually
handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired,
or other health impaired children, or children with specific learning
disabilities." 3
Popularly known as "mainstreaming,"3 2 LRE refers to the requirement that "to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children
'33
. . . [must be] educated with children who are not handicapped.
Nevertheless, the Act acknowledges that in certain circumstances handicapped children need to be educated in separate classes or special
schools.3 4
The fundamental procedure for meeting the FAPE and LRE requirements is the formulation of an IEP by a team consisting, at a minimum, of a qualified representative of the local district or intermediate
unit,35 the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian, and, where
appropriate, the child.36 Developed at a meeting of this team, the IEP
is a written statement including:
(A) . . .the present levels of educational performance of such
child, (B) . . .annual goals [and] short-term instructional objectives, (C) . . .the specific educational services to be provided to
such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for
initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules
for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional
objectives are being achieved.3 7
Under the Act, parents have the right to challenge the IEP at an impartial due process hearing, which is in turn subject to judicial review in
38
state or federal court.
30. Id. § 1412.
31. Id. § 1401(1).
32. "Mainstreaming" refers to the degree of contact with nonhandicapped children that
a handicapped child experiences as part of the educational process.

33. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B) (1976).
34. "[S]pecial classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." Id.
35. In some states, special education reviews are provided by intermediate units that
typically serve several small school districts.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976).
37. Id. The IEP must be reviewed and, when appropriate, revised at least annually. Id.

§ 1414 (a)(5).
38. Id. §§ 1415(b)(2) and (eXl). If the impartial due process hearing is conducted by the
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Case Law. Appropriate Education

As a result of hearing officer or state education agency decisions,
at the instance of parents or school districts, courts have attempted substantively to elucidate the meaning of "appropriate" in FAPE. These
substantive formulations vary widely. Although conveniently conceived of as a continuum from minimal adequacy on the one extreme
to potential maximization on the other,3 9 courts have not been limited
to selecting standards neatly arrayed on the line between these two
points.
Examples of standards that fit along the continuum abound. The
pre-Act seminal consent decree of Mills v. Board of Education,"'
arguably fits close to minimal adequacy, although the court used qualifiers such as "suitable" and "appropriate," rather than "minimum,"
along with "adequate."'" At the other extreme, a few lower courts have
erected a potential maximization standard, which was typically replaced by a lower standard on appeal.42 Equal opportunity standards,
in terms of either approximate overall comparability4 3 or specific
shortfall comparability,' fit in the intermediate range.
Several other courts have formulated standards of differing degrees and dimensions. As an extreme example, one federal district
judge applied a "best interest of the child" standard, only to have his
decision vacated on appeal.4 5 Another standard that some courts have
used is a balancing test, which weighs the personal needs of the individual child against the limited funding of local districts for all handilocal school district or intermediate unit, it shall be subject to independent review by the
state education agency prior to suit in federal or state court. Id. § 1415(c).
39. See Note, Enforcing The Right To An "ppropriate" Education: The Education For
All HandicappedChildren Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1125-26 (1979). This bipolar
conception was used by the district court in Rowley to specify its standard, and by the

Supreme Court majority to obscure it. See infra notes 57-58, 69 and accompanying text.
40. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The other key pre-Act access case, PARC, 343 F.
Supp. at 307, used "free, public.., and. . . appropriate" rather than "adequate." Id.
41. 348 F. Supp. at 878-79.
42. See, e.g., Age v. Bullitt County Public Schools, No. C78-0461-L(B) (W.D. Ky. Jan.
11, 1980), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR) 551:505 (1980), affd, 673 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1982).

Some courts have adopted such a standard based on the more explicit requirements of their
respective state statutes. See, e.g., Isgur v. School Comm. of Newton, 400 N.E.2d 1292, 1298
(Mass. App. 1980).
43. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (Justice Blackmun's concurrence).

44. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (Judge Broderick's district court opinion). This decision was summarily endorsed on appeal by the Second Circuit majority and
the Supreme Court dissent, see infra notes 59-60, 84-86 and accompanying text, and it was
variously applied by several other courts. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
Technically, it might be considered closer to the maximum extreme than Justice Blackmun's
test. See infra note 80.
45. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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capped children.' As a more typical example, several courts have used
a self-sufficiency standard, aimed at independence rather than institutionalization in adulthood. For example, the federal district court in
Armstrong v. Kline47 used a self-sufficiency standard to determine that
a school year beyond the customary 180 days may be appropriate for
certain severely handicapped students. On appeal, the Third Circuit
reached essentially the same result, but the majority opinion refused to
adopt a single substantive standard, suggested that self-sufficiency and
equal educational opportunity standards were premature, and implied
that multiple goals might be likely.48 Indeed, some courts have combined more than one standard.49
Most of these standards are considered in the various opinions of
the Rowley case. What emerges is a flexibly formulated new standard.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE ROWLEY CASE

A. FactualBackground

Amy Rowley is a deaf child attending a regular elementary school
in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District in Peekskill, New
York. She has limited residual hearing, but is an excellent lip reader.
Preparatory to Amy's entry into school, several members of the administrative and teaching staff took a sign language course to facilitate conversation with her. Also, a teletype machine was installed in the
principal's office to facilitate communication with her parents, who
were also deaf.5"
As agreed with Amy's parents, the kindergarten year began with a
trial period during which she was placed in a regular class without support services. At the end of the period, the school district provided her
with an FM wireless hearing aid. The school district also arranged for
a sign language interpreter to be in Amy's class full time for two
46. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 112-13 (W.D. Va. 1981).

47. 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629
F.2d 269, cert. denied sub nom. Scanlon v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1981). The Second Circuit
dissent in Rowley adopted a self-sufficiency standard, see in/pa note 62 and accompanying
text, but the Supreme Court rejected it. See infra text accompanying note 68.
48. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 278-79 & 279 n. II (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied
sub nom. Scanlon v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
49. See, e.g., Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61, 78 (S.D. Tenn.
1982); see also Mnfra note 62. The lower courts' Rowley standard is arguably a hybrid of

equal opportunity and potential maximization.
50. The initial factors of the sign language course and the teletype machine not only
established the tone but also introduced the narrowness of the Court's decision. What proportion of the nation's public schools have the time and resources, much less the willingness
and commitment, to make such preparations for a single student?
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weeks."' At the end of the period, the interpreter concluded that his
services were not needed at that time. Amy completed her kindergarten year successfully.
Under the EAHCA's requirements for an IEP, the district's multidisciplinary evaluation team met during the fall of Amy's first-grade
year and recommended that she be provided with: (1) continued use of
the wireless hearing aid, (2) the services of a tutor for the deaf for one
hour daily, and (3) the services of a speech therapist for three hours per
week. In addition to taking other testimony and visiting a class for the
deaf, the team received expert evidence from Amy's parents about the
importance of the services of a sign language interpreter but concluded
that such services were not needed.
Amy's teacher and the school administration adopted the team's
recommendation in her IEP. Amy's parents requested a due process
hearing. The independent hearing examiner agreed with the administration that an interpreter was not necessary because "'Amy was
achieving educationally, academically, and socially' without such
assistance. 5 2 The examiner's decision was affirmed on appeal to New
York's Commissioner of Education.
B. Lower Court Decisions
Amy's parents then brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, claiming that the school district's refusal to provide a full-time interpreter violated the FAPE requirement
of the EAHCA.5 3 The district court found that Amy was remarkably
well-adjusted, got along well with her peers and even better with her
teachers.5" The trial court also found that she was performing better
than the average child in her class,5 5 advancing easily from grade to
grade although she understood considerably less than she would have
if she were not deaf.5 6 The disparity between her achievement and her
51. This extra effort further narrowed the factual flexibility for the courts' decisionmaking.
52. 102 S. Ct. at 3040.
53. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 632 F.2d
945 (1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
54. The district court reported that she was sometimes called upon by her teacher to help
other students with their assignments. Id. at 53 1.
55. Her achievement test scores were all above grade level, by about one year on one
standardized test and - significantly enough - by about three years on a standardized test
that had been administered to her in sign language. Another fact not included in the
Supreme Court's opinion was that her IQ was 122. Id. at 532. The typical guideline score in
states that include special education status for gifted students, at least to the extent that IQ is
relied upon, is 130.
56. The district court found that with lip reading and the hearing aid, Amy could iden-
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potential performance without the handicap led the trial court to decide that she was not receiving an appropriate education, which it defined as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate
with the opportunity provided to other children.15 7 Such a standard,
explained the court, required comparing the differential between performance and potential - or "shortfall" - for the handicapped child
with that of his or her nonhandicapped peers.5"
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-to-1 decision, affirmed the district court's judgment.5 9 The majority took pains to emphasize the narrowness of the holding, stating that "our decision is
limited to the unique facts of this case, and is not intended as authority
The dissenting judge pointed to the "Herculean
beyond this case."'
efforts" of the school district and the erroneous premises of the district
judge,6 ' adopting instead a self-sufficiency standard based on various
"

tify only 59% of the words spoken to her, another fact left out of the Supreme Court's summary. Id. at 532.
57. Id. at 534. Relying mistakenly on the § 504 regulation that defines "appropriate
education," see infra note 175, and drawing heavily on the Harvard Note, supra note 39, at
1125-26, the district court assumed that "it has been left entirely to the courts and the hearing officers to give content to the requirement of an 'appropriate education."' It did not
address the issue of the court's standard of review over hearing officer decisions. 483 F.
Supp. at 533.
Further, the district court's opinion did not mention that there is support for a comparative approach in the EAHCA regulations, the Act's legislative history, and implicitly in
the statutory definition of FAPE. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(2) (1982); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.305 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3054-55 (White, J., dissenting);
Amicus Brief for United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n at 8 n.2, Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct.
3034 (1982).
58. 483 F. Supp. at 534-35. The concept of "educational shortfall" appears to be allur-

ingly objective in a quantifiable sense. As several sources have pointed out, however, the
state of the art in measurement and special education defies determination and remediation
of the difference across the varying types and ranges of handicaps. See, e.g., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277, 280 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981). The district
court alluded to, but underestimated, the measurement difficulties in the application of this

concept. 483 F. Supp. at 534-35. Nevertheless, it has been aptly counter-argued that the
quantitative aspect of the lower court's decision is not an integral part of the holding nor a
necessary aspect of its application. See Amicus Brief for United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n at 15
n.2, Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
59. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
60. Id. at 948. The appeals court went so far as to invoke a provision of its rules that
would preclude citing its decision as authority in any other case, "thus recognizing what we
believe to be [its] lack of precedential value." Id. at 948 n.7. For criticism of such use of
nonprecedential precedent, see Board of Educ. v. McCluskey, 102 S. Ct. 3469, 3472-73
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. 632 F.2d at 951-53 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Although hyperbolizing the school
district's efforts, the dissent seems quite correct in identifying these three misconceptions of
the lower court's opinion: (1) the failure to recognize and use the EAHCA's definition of
appropriate education, (2) the reliance on the § 504 regulation, see supra note 57, and (3) the

practical impossibility of applying the shortfall standards, see supra note 58. Judge Mans-
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statements in the Senate debates.6 2 Amy's IEP obviously met this
standard.
C. Supreme Court Decision
A divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision,
enunciating not only a different view of appropriate education, but also
a specific standard of judicial review under the EAHCA.6 3 The majority opinion was authored by Justice Rehnquist and subscribed to by
four other justices. Justice Blackmun reached the same result based on
different standards of appropriate education and judicial review. Justice White's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
The Rehnquist majority pointed out, like the Second Circuit dissent, the unexplained failure of the district court to recognize the statutory definitions64 and pieced together a composite test from separate
segments of statutory language.6 5 Before hardening the test into a
holding, the majority analyzed the Act's legislative history in search of
field's assertion that "[n]o support for this [commensurate opportunity) definition is to be
found in the Act, its legislative history, or in regulations promulgated thereunder," id. at
952, is not on target. See supra note 57.
62. 632 F.2d at 951-52. The dissenting judge did not completely reject the comparative
approach, stating that the self-sufficiency standard "would hopefully promote academic
achievement by the child that would roughly approximate that of his or her nonhandicapped
classmates." Id. at 953.
63. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
64. Id. at 3040 n.8. Inasmuch as the Act defines FAPE in terms of "special education"
and "related services" that meet certain conditions, the majority recited and spliced in the
definitions of these two terms in tandem with the list of conditions, finding the standard of
educational benefit in the rather remote definition of "related services." Id. at 3041-42 &
3048. See infra note 65.
65. The Court went through three iterations of the test, incorporating successive and
subtle changes in form. Appearing early in the opinion, the first form was as follows:
[FAPE] consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs
of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary as to permit the
child "to benefit" from the instruction. Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the
Act, the definition also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public
expense and under public supervision, meet the State's educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular education, and comport with the child's
IEP.
102 S. Ct. at 3041-42. A difference between the statutory definition and the Court's iteration
is that the Court expanded the statutory language ("the standards of the State educational
agency") to require that the instruction meet "the State's educational standards." Dropping
the "agency" broadens the scope of the standard, allowing for state statutory variation as
delineated infra part IV.
The second iteration, which immediately followed the first, was:
Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to
permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional
checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a "free appropriate public education" as
defined by the Act.
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"some additional substantive standard."66 Finding a repeated emphasis on access and procedures as being more important than substance
and outcome, the majority successfully rejected equal educational opportunity6 7 and self-sufficiency6" as each demanding too little or too
much depending on the situation. For example, the Court rejected
both the input and the output extremes of the equal educational opportunity standard, correctly concluding that "to speak in terms of 'equal'
services in one instance [i.e., equal input] gives less than what is required by the Act and in another instance [i.e., equally potential-maximizing output] more." 6 9 Similarly, looking at the application of the
self-sufficiency standard to degree only, not also kind, of handicap, the
majority concluded that "'self-sufficiency' as a substantive standard is
at once an inadequate protection [for the mildly handicapped] and an
overly demanding requirement [for the severely handicapped]. 7 °
Rather, restricting itself to Amy Rowley's situation, the Court
looked to the mainstreaming preference in the Act and to the prevailing
practices in the schools, and concluded that for handicapped children
who are being educated in regular classrooms, "[tjhe grading and advancement system"' 7' is one, although not the only,7 2 factor for deterId. at 3042. Subtle transformations again can be detected. For example, the qualified characterization of "[almostas a checklist" (emphasis added) has lost its qualifier.
The significance of these language changes remains to be seen. For the final iteration, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 3042. By means of alluringly quotable and metaphorical dicta, the majority
erected the mirage/image of the public school as a house of opportunity, containing not only
the proverbial door, but also a slippery floor:
Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.
We therefore conclude that the basicfloor of opportunity. . . consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.
Id. at 3043, 3048 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 3047.
68. Id. at 3048 n.23.
69. Id. at 3047. The Court deftly ignored the lower courts' intermediate output standard
(maximizing potential commensurate with other students). Justice Rehnquist similarly
slighted the lower courts' standard by cloaking it under the false label of "strict equality of
opportunity or services." Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 3048 n.23.
71. Id. at 3049.
72. Id. at 3049 n.25 (emphasis added):
We do not hold today that every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to
grade in a regular public school system is automatically receiving a "free appropriate
public education." In this case, however, we find Amy's academic progress, when considered with the specialservices andprofessionalconsiderationaccordedby the. . . school
administrators,to be dispositive.
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mining appropriateness. The majority then arrived at the finalized
form of its answer to the appropriateness issue in this case:
[W]e hold that it satisfies [the FAPE] requirement by providing
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit
the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must
meet the State's educational standards, must approximate the
grade levels used in the State's regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore the
personalized instruction, should be formulated in accordance with
the requirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in
the regular classrooms of the public education system, should be
reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks
and advance from grade to grade.7 3
As for the issue of the proper standard of judicial review under the
Act, the majority steered an intermediate course between the Rowley's
arguments for a de novo posture and the school district's advocacy of a
markedly deferential standard.7 4 Interpreting Congress' replacement
of the substantial evidence standard with language that courts were to
make "independent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the evidence"7 5 as clear legislative rejection of that standard, the majority
viewed Congress' placement of the relevant language in the "Procedural Safeguards" section7 6 and the general emphasis of the Act on
administrative procedures as offering sufficient counterweight to yield
this two-fold standard:
73. Id. at 3049 (footnote omitted). Following the flow of the earlier iterations, see supra
note 65, this final formulation adds only a circular and superfluous caveat about procedural
compliance and, for the mainstreamed child, subtly yet suddenly recasts the grade advancement criterion in the school district's favor. Rather than grade advancement being something actually obtained, it seems sufficient for the district to make it reasonably attainable;
for under the majority's holding, the child's program needs to be "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade." 102 S. Ct. at
3049.
74. The school authorities argued that the Act accorded the courts limited authority with
regard to procedural compliance and no authority with regard to substantive matters. Id. at
3050. This standard would seem to provide even more deference than the traditional substantial evidence test for administrative decisions.
75. Id. at 3050-51 (citing S. CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975), and 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1976)).

76. This is a makeweight argument. As the dissent aptly asked: "[W]here else would a
provision for judicial review belong?" Id. at 3056 (White, J., dissenting).
The real concern of the majority may well have been the proverbial parade of horribles. Justice Stevens is reported to have remarked during oral arguments in Rowley: "The
problem I see with this case is that once you acknowledge that there are some substantive

matters that a court can review, where do you stop?" See EHLR SpecialReport: The RowleyArgument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 EHLR (CRR) AC105 (Supp. 68 March 19, 1982).
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First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the
Act? And second, is the [IEP]. . . reasonably
calculated to enable
77
the child to receive educational benefits?
The majority closed with a lesson in our federalism in relation to public
education, including a reading from the text of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez ,71 and with a paean to the parents of handicapped
children, expressed faithful reliance on their ardent advocacy.7 9
In his sole concurrence, Justice Blackmun reached the same result
by employing a totality-of-the-circumstances, equal-educational-opportunity approach. He stated the standard as follows:
[W]hether Amy's program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was
substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates.8 0
Adapting the comparison component of the lower court's test, Justice
Blackmun adopted a more ad hoc approach, narrow in its factual
boundaries8 ' yet flexible within them.8 2 As for judicial review, he
stressed deference to the quasi-judicial levels of the administrative pro77. 102 S. Ct. at 3051 (footnotes omitted). The first prong of this test is tied to the
aforementioned penchant for proceduralism. See supra notes 8-9. The second prong is a
clever combination of the first and last elements of the majority's appropriateness test: "educational benefits" from the initial definition of related services and "reasonably calculated"
from the additional criterion for mainstreamed youngsters. See supra notes 64, 73 and accompanying text. Thus, although there is some basis for the parts, there seems to be some
alchemical prestidigitation rather than reasoned elaboration in their placement.
Some commentators see this review standard as virtually encompassing de novo review. Eg., author's conversation with Michael Rebell, Nov. 30, 1982. But the majority's
specific refusal to give reviewing courts a "free hand" and the dissent's counter-argument for
a de novo standard suggest a more limited view. Id. at 3050-51, 3056-57. The limit would
appear to lie between the introduction of evidence and its evaluation in terms of policy or
law. Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 806 (1st Cir. 1982).
78. 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (involving "the most persistent anddifficult questions of educational policy. .. in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels") (emphasis added to show the words specifically quoted in Rowley).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3052. But see Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(judge criticized parent's adversarial attitude toward school officials). See also Weinstein,
Education of Exceptional Children, 12 CREIGirON L. REv. 987, 1033 (1979) ("In many
cases, parents are either not equipped, or simply refuse, to represent what society sees as the
best interests of their handicapped children."). In one case, Judge Weinstein found that the
parents of culturally disadvantaged children were not adequately served by technical compliance with the Act's notice requirements. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211,
1288 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
80. 102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun found "equal protection" language in the legislative history of the Act. Colley cited an article by Senator
Stafford and the Act's "Statement of Findings and Purpose" to support further this point of
view. See Colley, supra note 27, at 143.
81. The emphasis on understanding and on nonhandicapped classmates at least implicitly suggests the narrow context of a deaf child in a mainstream placement.
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83
cess and a focus on the "total package of services.
As in Rodriguez, Justice White authored Rowley's three-man dissent. Relative to the majority, the dissent had some worthwhile insights,14 and others that were inaccurate.8 5 The dissent embraced the
lower courts' standard of appropriate education without reciting it and
a de novo review standard without the lower courts' having
enunciated
86
stated it.

III.

ROOM

FOR RIGOR WITHIN AND BEYOND ROWLEY

A.

Notable Narrowness

The majority opinion in Rowley - like the alternative approaches
of the concurrence 87 and, via the dissent, 8 the Second Circuit8 9 - was
notably narrow. First, the unusual circumstances of the school district's preparations" and the plaintiff's performance 9 ' implicitly set
narrow boundaries for these alternative opinions. Second and more
important, the Court expressly demarcated a restricted perimeter for its
decision, prefacing its holding with this caveat:
We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining
the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children
covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a
handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in
the regular classrooms of92a public school system, we confine our
analysis to that situation.
82. In contrast to the lower court approach, there is no hint of quantifiable objectivity.
102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. Id.

84. See, for example, the dissent's observation that the "full opportunity" and "equal
opportunity" references were too frequent to be merely passing references, and the point
that Mills stands for proportional, not "some," education. Id. at 3054 & 3055 n.2. See also
supra note 76.
85. Compare 102 S.Ct. at 3055 (White, J. dissenting) ("Amy Rowley, without a sign
language interpreter, comprehends less than half of what is said in the classroom") with

supra note 56. Similarly, the dissent's reading of Senator Williams' statements confused
scope of review with standard of review. Id. at 3056.
86. Id. at 3056-57. In response to the majority's metaphorical constructions, see supra
note 66, the dissent repainted the "floor of opportunity" as "intended to eliminate the effects
of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to
learn if that is reasonably possible." Id. at 3055.
87. See supra note 81.
88. See supra text accompanying note 86.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See
See
See
102

supra note 60 and accompanying text.
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
supra notes 55-56.
S. Ct. at 3049. The Court's caveat is more severe than the factual limitations
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Finally, the only element of the holding that was not drawn directly
from the statutory definitions, that of grade advancement, was added
only and explicitly for mainstreamed students - and even then, the
Court avoided generalizing to all such students, finding it to be dispositive only in the limited circumstances of Amy's case.93
The narrowness of the Rowley decision, and thus its amenability to
being distinguished from other cases, is demonstrated by two recent
hearing officer decisions in Massachusetts. In the first case,94 although
faced with a child of the same type and severity of handicap,95 the
hearing officer found Rowley to be readily distinguishable because the
child was not advancing easily from grade to grade.9 6 In the second
case, 97 another hearing officer similarly found the circumstances of a
severely multi-handicapped student in a private placement to be
"clearly distinguishable from those presented by Rowley." 9 As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the Rowley Court implicitly and
explicitly left several hooks on which to hang such a factual distinction,
and thus to climb beyond and above its confines.
B. Ambiguous and Latent Standard
The majority's standard in Rowley clearly permits and implicitly
anticipates the Court's future forays into the substantive area as this
area matures. 99 In stating that "[w]e do not attempt today" 'I to establish any single test for all handicapped children beyond the admittedly
"cryptic"''
statutory definition, the Court left open the possibility of
later establishing a higher and broader-based standard, and the
probability of adding a ramp to the second floor of opportunity at least
for some handicapped children."0 2 Further, the Court expressly issued
inherent in judicial holdings. In its deliberations, the Court emphasized the unique nature
of handicapping conditions. d. at 3041, 3048 n.23, 3049.
93. See supra note 72.
94. In re Brockton Pub. Schools, Mass. Case No. 5532 (Mass. State Educ. Agency Aug.
16, 1982), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR) 504:128 (1982).
95. The child was a moderately to profoundly deaf six-year-old.
96. The hearing officer failed to point out that the major distinction between Brockton
and Rowley is that the child in Brockton attended a private school for deaf children whereas
the Rowley holding was limited to children in regular classrooms. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
97. In re West Brookfield Pub. Schools, Mass. Case No. 6016 (Mass. State Educ. Agency
Oct. 19, 1982), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR) 504:166 (1982).
98. Id. at 504:169.
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
100. 102 S.Ct. at 3049 (emphasis added). For the complete quote, see supra text accompanying note 92.
101. Id. at 3041.
102. Cf. Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982) ("As plaintiffs point-
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an invitation for experimentation and formulation beyond its stated
statutory minimum by "state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child." 0 3 At the confluence
of the parent-school planning and placement process stand the impartial hearing officers, who at local or state levels" ° are left with broad
discretion to develop and to apply substantive standards within and
beyond Rowley.' °5 Moreover, the Act's requirement of centralized reporting of hearing officer decisions" favors and facilitates the development of a common law in this area. 0 7 The national collection and
dissemination of these local and state quasi-judicial decisions by a
commercial clearing house further promotes this development. 0 8
A close reading of the Court's opinion reveals that it is not limited
to access and procedures." °9 Notwithstanding the majority's assertion
that "[n]oticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard,""l 0 the Court in effect accorded substantive status to
its purportedly procedural standard by searching in the legislative history for "some additional substantive standard.""' Similarly, in stating
that "the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public educaedly observe, 'It is not enough to open the door for the handicapped. . . ;a ramp must be
built so the door can be reached.' ")(quoting Brief for Appellants at 20-21) (accommodating
the handicapped in public transportation). The significant dimension in Rowley is that it
establishes a floor, not a ceiling, of substantive educational opportunity.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 3051.
104. The Act allows for the mandatory impartial hearing to be conducted by the local,
intermediate, or state agency, depending upon state law. See supra note 38. Thus, there is
variation from state to state. See, e.g., L. KOTIN & N. EAGER, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 51-164 (1977). The term "hearing officer" is used generically in this Article to include the impartial reviews by the state education agency (SEA).
105. Unlike the state and federal courts, the hearing officers are not constrained by the
Rowley standard for judicial review.
106. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(4) (1976). The findings and decisions, with personally identifiable information deleted, must be submitted to the state advisory panel established under
the Act. 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(5) (1982).
107. See Moore & Bulman, Recent Changesin the LawAffecting EducationalHearingProceduresforHandicappedChildren, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 41, 65 (1977). A tension is apparent,
however, between the centralized reporting and the individualized tenor of the Act. For
example, Connecticut hearing officers reportedly have refused to be influenced by their colleagues' decisions because the circumstances of each handicapped child are unique. Author's conversation with Attorney Thomas Mooney, Feb. 4, 1982.
108. The CRR Publishing Company in Washington, D.C., produces the Education for
the Handicapped Law Report (abbreviated herein as "EHLR"). This looseleaf service includes several other sources of legal information beyond the hearing officer and SEA
decisions.
109. For further discussion of the overlap and transition, see supra notes 8-9.
110. 102 S.Ct. at 3042.
111. Id. (emphasis added). One is obversely reminded of Justice Frankfurter's protest
that "[t]his plainly procedural section [§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act] is
transmuted into a mandate to the federal courts to fashion a whole body of substantive law,
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tion . . . on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular

level,"" 2 the Court not only left open the meaning of "appropriate,"
but also implicitly recognized that Congress intended a particular substantive level. This use of relative rather than exclusive language permeates the Court's opinion.
Furthermore, a careful reader of Rowley notices that at times the
Court accords the substantive aspects of the EAHCA the same status as
the Act's procedural aspects." 3 Thus, for example, when the Court
suggested that "Congress used the word [appropriate] as much to describe the settings in which handicapped children should be educated
as to prescribe the substantive content or supportive services of their
education,""' 4 the Court gave equal force to the substantive services
issues that it gave to the procedural access questions. Similarly, when
the Court stated that "Congress placed every bit as much emphasis
upon compliance with procedures.

. .

as it did upon the measurement

of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard,"' ' 5 it seems to be
no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon judicial review of substantive matters as it did upon that of
procedural matters. Thus, the substantive component of the majority's
decision lies there half-hidden in the answers to both appropriateness
and judicial review issues," 6 waiting to be uncovered by hearing officers and judges who wish to look beyond the dark surface for the
proverbial diamonds in the rough.
Moreover, when the Court did point to substantive standards, it
phrased them so ambiguously that they are susceptible to stretching by
. . ." See Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 461-62

(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
112. 102 S.Ct. at 3043 (emphasis added). For the complete quotation, see supra note 66.
Similarly, in the companion quote about Congress not "impos[ing] upon the States any
greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make. . . access meaningful," the Court imposed the substantive standard of "meaningful" educational opportunity. Id.
113. At other times, as in the foregoing instances, the Court does not accord the substan-.
tive standard equal weight, but nevertheless does not exclude it. For further examples, see
id. at 3043 ("Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped
children") (emphasis added); id. at 3050 ("adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much f not all of what Congress wished in the way of
substantive content in an IEP") (emphasis added); id. at 3051 ("[the Act's] obligations [are]
largely procedural in nature") (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 3046 n.21 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 3050.
116. One commentator speculated that Justice Rehnquist was compelled to provide such
half-hearted indications of a substantive standard, and not merely rely on equal access, in
order to attract sufficient support for a majority opinion. See EHLR Analysis: What Rowley
Means, 3 EHLR (CRR) SA29, SA35 (Supp. 84 Nov. 12, 1982).
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an activist judge or hearing officer. For example, when the Court ruled
that the "access. . .provided be sufficient to confer some educational
benefit,"" 7 it did not foreclose artful advocates from convincing hearing officers and courts that "some" means more than the minimum.
Similarly, when the Court essentially stated that programmatic access
would have to be provided at a "meaningful" level "I it left open what
one commentator called the "64,000 dollar question.""' 9 The aforementioned Massachusetts cases' 20 again point the way: the hearing officers decided that even if Rowley had not been distinguishable, the
school districts' proposed placements did not meet the Court's
standard.
Finally, when the majority established a grade attainment criterion for mainstreamed placements, the Court may have erected a
higher standard than it expected, notwithstanding its "reasonably calculated" qualifier.' 2 1 Reflecting the preference of the Act for the "least
restrictive environment,"' 22 over ninety percent of school-aged handicapped children currently are being educated in regular public schools
and over seventy percent are being educated in classrooms with nonhandicapped youngsters. 123 For a substantial segment of these handicapped pupils, grade attainment may be a difficult achievement. A
recent trend toward minimum competency tests such as promotion and
graduation prerequisites illustrates and even aggravates this difficulty.'2 Indeed, for many handicapped children educated in regular
classrooms, even a standard somewhat lower than grade attainment
may be excessive.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 3048 (emphasis added).
118. See supra note 112. Characterizing the majority opinion as open to two interpretations - meaningful education and minimum benefits - a recent analysis construed the
opinion to stand for the meaningful education standard. See The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, 96 HARV. L. REv.9, 303 (1982).
119. Stotland & Mancuso, supra note 17, at AC162.
120. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 73, 77 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
123. EditorialNote: Annual Report to Congress, I EHLR (CRR) 104:259, 104:261 (Supp.
84 Nov. 12, 1982).
124. See generally Stroup & Zirkel, A Legal Look at the Retention - Promotion Controversy, 21 J.SCHOOL PSYCH. (forthcoming, 1983). For decisions sustaining the use of competency tests as a diploma requirement for handicapped as wel as other students after
sufficient notice, see Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd.of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983);
Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.Ga. 1981); Board of Educ. v. Ambach, 458
N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
The other edge of the sword is represented by the prior trend toward liberal "social
promotion," which lowers the standard for handicapped students - like the lower court
Rowley test - commensurate with that of their nonhandicapped peers.
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C. IncidentalEffects
In addition to the latent meaningfulness of Rowley for the cases
that have issues of appropriate education and judicial review, the decision also provides some leverage with respect to other issues, such as
the burden of proof. Lang v. Braintree School Committee 2 ' provides
an example. In that case, the federal district court in Massachusetts where the law, like that of approximately half of the other states, is
silent on the burden, of proof issue 126 - found that Rowley "provides
significant guidance" in determining who had the burden of proof with
respect to the appropriateness of the proposed placement.' 27 The parents sought a continuation of the child's placement in a private special
education facility, while the school district proposed that she be placed
in one of its regular classrooms. The district had committed a technical
irregularity by amending the child's IEP without the parents' participation. Given Rowley's emphasis on procedural compliance and the Act's
seeming preference for maintaining the status quo,121 the court decided
29
that the burden must rest with the defendant school board.
Even where procedural irregularities are absent, Rowley still might
affect the allocation of the burden. It could be argued that Rowley interpreted the Act as incorporating the major principles of the right-toeducation cases.' 30 Inasmuch as one of these principles was placing the
burden on the school district,' 3 ' federal policy - as thus incorporated
in the Act and as reflected in the vast majority of states that have addressed this issue pursuant to the Act - arguably dictates by implication or preemption 3 2 this result, even in the negligible minority of
states that place the burden on the parents (New York) 3 3 or the moving party (Connecticut)."
125. 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982).
126. See L. KoTrN & N. EAGER, supra note 104, at 18, 102.
127. 545 F. Supp. at 1227.
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976) ("stay-put" provision).
129. Nevertheless, aided by the hearing officer's determination, the court concluded that
the defendant school district had met its burden. 545 F. Supp. at 1228.
130. 102 S. Ct. at 3044 (noting such language in the legislative history and stating that
"the principles which [PA4RC and Mi//s] established are the principles which, to a significant
extent, guided the drafters of the Act"). For further reference to these cases, see supra note
5.
131. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972); Lebanks v.
Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 142 (E.D. La. 1973).
132. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
133. L. KoTiN & N. EAGER, supra note 104, at 122. The New York City hearing office,
which holds at least half of New York State's hearings, clearly places the burden on the
board. Author's conversation with Michael Rebell (Jan. 14, 1983).
134. Eg., CoNN. AGENcIEs REGs. § 10-76h-2(f)(4).
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The Rowley decision's affirmation of several of the major provisions of the Act, and its incorportion of the bulk of the prior cases'
principles, provides other handles for extending Rowley's impact to further issues relating to the handicapped. For example, it may be argued
that the Court provided an opportunity - within or beyond the confines of the decision - to use a multifactor, ad hoc test for determining
the meaning of appropriate education. The argument for employing
such a standard within the confines of the decision is based upon the
substantive ambiguity and latency in the majority's opinion.1 3 5 The aris that Rowley is
gument for using it beyond the confines of the decision
m
3
136
controlling.'
not
otherwise
or
distinguishable
In any event, a clue that the Court contemplated such an ad hoc
approach is that the Court vigorously avoided establishing a single substantive standard, expressly limiting its analysis to Amy Rowley's situation. 13 Stating that "a myriad of factors. . . might affect a particular
student's ability to assimilate information presented in the classroom,"' 139 the Court emphasized that a single standard would be particularly inappropriate. For example, as the Court recognized, a selfsufficiency standard might make sense for a mildly handicapped child,
whereas the same standard would be unreachable for one who is severely handicapped. 'I
Some commentators have analogized this ad hoc approach to the
best-interests-of-the-child standard that is typical of juvenile justice
and custody. 4 ' The decision of a federal district judge in Pennsylvania, who borrowed on his prior experience as a juvenile judge to
uphold the private school placement of a deaf child, serves as a colorful
illustration of this approach., 4 2 To those who would decry the unpredictable subjectivity of this totality-of-the-circumstances test, it can be
counterargued that at least this approach can evolve openly toward rational predictability, while the seemingly objective standard of the
135. See supra 99-124 and accompanying text. The concurrence explicitly embraced such
a holistic approach. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 149-171 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
139. 102 S. Ct. at 3047.
140. Id. The Court also pointed out that similar problems exist when other standards are
used. See text accompanying notes 69-70.
141. See, e.g., Stotland & Mancuso, supra note 17, at AC163.
142. See Grkman v. Scanlon, 528 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Pa. 1981), vacated and remanded,
No. 82-5157 (3d Cir. Dec. 17, 1982); cf.In re Lofai, 383 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Faro. Ct. 1976); In re
Kirschner, 344 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Faro. Ct. 1973); In re Downey, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Faro. Ct.
1973) (family court actions to effectuate appropriate placements for handicapped children).
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Rowley lower courts 43 has been belied by its bewildering application.
For example, the lower courts' decision in Rowley was interpreted to
support claims of plaintiff parents in some cases,'" but it was found not
to apply in other cases, 14 5 and supportive of the positions of school districts in still others"* without any detectable consistency and predictability. Thus, in one of the latter decisions, the Iowa Supreme Court
cited the Second Circuit's Rowley ruling on the way to this ad hoc conclusion: "Whether equality of education is actually realized depends
on the nature of the handicap, availability of resources,
and what effort
147
case."'
individual
the
of
context
the
in
reasonable
is

IV.

ALTERNATE BASES

A. State Statutes
The principal avenue for reaching a broader and higher standard
beyond the confines of Rowley is the special education legislation in
48
some states. For example, one of the previously mentioned cases'
that employed a multifactor approach, was decided under an Iowa statute requiring that special education students "shall, if reasonably possible, receive a level of education commensurate with the level provided
each child who does not require special education."' 149 This statutory
standard resembles the lower courts' Rowley standard reborn.
Thus the possibility of revitalizing the rigor of the lower courts'
view of Rowley in at least some areas of the country via a shift to state
standards is the most probable, and perhaps the most powerful, course
of related litigation in the near future. The pattern of this predicted
movement is demonstrated by the flow of activity after RodriguezI50 in
the analogous area of school finance. Although based on a shift from
143. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1983) (No. 82-1292); Espino v.
Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 913 (S.D. Tex. 1981); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State,
131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1982).
145. See, e.g., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 276-78 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 968 (1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 53-54
(N.D. Ala. 1981).
146. See, e.g., Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981); Buchholtz v.
Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 793-94 (Iowa 1982).
147. Buchholtz, 315 N.W.2d at 793.
148. Id.
149. IOWA CODE ANN. § 281.2(2)(West Supp. 1982-83). This statute also requires school
districts to provide "special education opportunities sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of children requiring special education." Id. For a related law review
article, see Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 4.
150. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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federal to state constitutional, rather than statutory, provisions, the
general result of the post-Rodriguez litigation should be the same after
Rowley: state-to-state variation. ' 5' As after Rodriguez, this variation
will likely be based not only on differences in the language of the relevant state provisions, 52 but also on a result-oriented reading of legislative history and other sources of interpretation. 5 a
The raw material of state statutory provisions relating to the
mandatory quality of special education varies widely. The language of
"appropriate" education appears in approximately one half of the
states, sometimes in combination with other standards such as "competent" (Alaska), "needs" (California and Delaware), "meaningful" (Nebraska), and "maximize" (Tennessee). 154 Similarly, Maryland's
statutory standard combines "compensatory" with "appropriate" in
describing the free special educational services available to each handicapped child.'I" Other statutory standards include maximum-type language in approximately six states, 5 6 language relating only to needs in
approximately nine states, 57 and further miscellaneous formulations in

approximately nine states.

58

151. Approximately half of the twenty or so school finance cases since Rodriguez have
been decided in favor of a more rigorous result, striking down the constitutionality of the
applicable state statutes. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: The Interpretationof State
ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1444-59 (1982).
152. Compare Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 386, 390 N.E.2d. 813, 826
(1979) ("a thorough and efficient system of common schools"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980) with Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 501, 303 A.2d 273, 287-88, (1973) ("a thorough
and efficient system of free public schools"), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 976 (1974).

153. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 79, at 994 ("Given the inconclusive results reached
by attempted application of any equal protection or jurisprudential principle, it is not surprising that in the final analysis these questions are decided on public policy grounds, as

shaped by political pressures.").
154. EHLR Special Report.: Status of State Legislation, 3 EHLR (CRR) AC134, AC134AC143 (Supp. 72 May 14, 1982) (summary of survey by Christiane Citron available from
Education Commission of the States).
155. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-402(b)(1982). For related analysis see Note, A ProceduralGuideline ForImplementing The Right To FreePublicEducation ForHandicappedChildren, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 136 (1974).

156. E.g, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-2116 (1980) ("to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities"); IDAHO CODE § 33-2002 (1981) ("to develop to their fullest capacity"); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71B § 2 (West Supp. 1981) ("to assure the maximum possible development
of a child with special needs").
157. Eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-763 (1981) ("commensurate with their abilities
and needs"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-961 (1981) ("in accord with his or her abilities and
capacities"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 157.200 (Supp. 1980) ("to meet the unique needs"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 16-24-1 (1981) ("best satisfy the needs").
158. Eg. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76 d(a)(West Supp. 1981) ("suitable"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A: 46-13 (West Supp. 1981) ("suitable"); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402.2 (McKinney
1981) ("suitable"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1372 (Purdon Supp. 1981) ("proper"); NEV.
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The argument for state judicial processing of this raw material into
a more rigorous result is that, in contrast to situations where the state
statutes conflict with the EAHCA and thus have been subordinated to
its standards via the supremacy clause,' 59 state standards may go beyond those of the EAHCA without running afoul of Rowley. Examples
of this approach already have surfaced at the hearing officer, state education agency (SEA) review, and judicial appeal levels. The In re
Brockton Public Schools case"6 mentioned above, again exemplifies
the way to move beyond, as well as around, Rowley. In upholding the
parents' claim for a private placement for their six-year-old deaf child,
the hearing officer stated:
Rowley deals with a question of statutory interpretation of the
Federal special education law, and is largely based upon an analysis of Federal Congressional history. Such analysis cannot presume to be a determinative reading of the Massachusetts' statute
and its legislative history. Insofar as my conclusion in this case is
based upon Massachusetts as well as Federal law, the Rowley decision is not controlling. Indeed the Court repeatedly stresses the
paramount role of the States in the area of education.' 6 '
At the SEA level, a review officer in a Michigan case ruled that the
state statutory provision requiring that the child's program be
"designed to develop the maximum potential" was more stringent than
the federal statutory standard, and thus had to be separately addressed.' 6 2 Finding such decisions to merit an individual case-by-case
approach based on multiple factors, 6 3 the SEA review officer overturned a hearing officer decision which had ruled that the district must
provide a cued-speech interpreting service during the child's part-time
regular class placement. 16
REv. STAT. § 388.450(l)(1979) ("equal educational opportunity"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2941 (1968) ("equal educational opportunity").
159. See, e.g., Vogel v. School Bd., 491 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Parks v. Illinois
Dep't of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 110 Ill. App. 3d 184, 441 N.E.2d
1209 (1982).
160. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
161. Brockton, 3 EHLR (CRR) at 504:131; see also In re West Brookfield Pub. Schools,
Mass. Case No. 6016 (Mass. State Educ. Agency Oct. 19, 1982), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR)
504:166, 169 (1982).
162. In re Traverse Bay Area Intermediate School Dist., Mich. Case No. 82-0143 (Mich.
State Educ. Agency Aug. 9, 1982), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR) 504:140, 504:142 (1982).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 135-42.
164. Similar to Amy Rowley, this deaf child had an IQ of 125. The Rowley decision was
not specifically mentioned in the review officer's opinion. Although the standard seemed to
be more rigorous than that in Rowley, the result reflects the pattern of result-oriented variation. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
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Similarly siding with the school district, the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina'65 interestingly concluded that the state statutory provision for an "appropriate publicly supported education" intended the
standard enunciated by the lower courts 166 - and Justice White's dissent - in Rowley. Citing the maximum-type prefatory language in the
state's statute, 67 the North Carolina court reasoned as follows:
Although our statute was designed, in part, to bring the State in
conformity with the federal statute.

. .

the Rowley Court's inter-

pretation of Congress' intent does not control our interpretation of
our General Assembly's intent. We believe that our General Assembly "intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least
to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to
learn if that is reasonably possible." Under this standard a handicapped child should be given the opportunity to achieve68 his full
potential commensurate with that given other children.
Nevertheless, as another example of the standard's bewildering unpredictability, the Harrell court decided that the plaintiff parents did not
meet this higher standard.
This post-Rodriguez-like resort to state standards beyond the federal minimum 169 would seem to have at least seeds in the express as

well as the implicit intent of the majority opinion in Rowley' 7 ° and in
related decisions.' 7 ' Such a step may eventually lead, after appropriate
165. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E. 2d 687, appeal dismissed, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d 759 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Mar. 1,
1983). Cf. Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 812-13 (1st Cir. 1982) (found claim for reimbursement arguably valid under state statute where not available under EAHCA).
166. 293 S.E.2d at 690 (citing G.S. § 115-363 (1977), recodified as G.S. § 115C106)(1981)).
167. "[T]he policy of the State is to ensure every child a fair and full opportunity to reach
his full potential ....
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106 (1981).
As a result of Rowley, some North Carolina legislators have moved to replace this
language with the Supreme Court's definition of FAPE. See Educ. Week, Feb. 2, 1983, at 4,
col. 1.
168. 293 S.E.2d at 690 (citation to Rowley dissent omitted). Cf. Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't
of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1982) ("The State is given proper leeway to
establish the appropriate educational standard.") (citation of EAHCA omitted). See supra
text accompanying note 143.

169. Similarly, the California courts shifted to "independent state grounds" in Serrano I
after the Supreme Court in Rodriguez removed the federal underpinning of SerranoI. See
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929 (1977), 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, cert denied sub
nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
170. See, e.g., supra note 65.
171. See, e.g., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[We are] hopeful
that the states, in cooperation with the Commissioner of Education, will establish acceptable
guidelines to aid in that most difficult decision [of evaluating the substantive meaning of
appropriate education]"), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
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innovation and experimentation, to revised standards at the federal
level via legislation or regulations.
B.

Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973172

Section 504 is broad civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination against handicapped individuals involved in federally funded activities,' including education. 7 4 Although the section 504 regulation
that also determines what constitutes an appropriate education' 7 5 was
mistakenly relied upon in the district court decision in Rowley, section
504 suits by deaf students for the services of an interpreter at the postsecondary level 7 6 point to an alternate approach for resuscitating the
lower court standard.' 7 7 Although both section 504 and the EAHCA
have been characterized as legislative reactions to Rodriguez on behalf
of the handicapped, 7 ' the differences in the scope of appropriate education under the two statutes have been recognized by commentators 7 9
172. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is scattered in 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (Supp. V 1982).
Section 504 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1982).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1982). The exact language provides: "No otherwise qualishall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
fied handicapped individual ...
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
174. Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of Handicapped Children to an Appropriate Education.Procedures and Remedies, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1981).
175. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1)(i) (1982) ("designed to meet individual educational needs of
handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met.") See
supra notes 57 and 61. A federal district court recently cited the majority's decision in Rowley to sustain the nondiscrimination - and to reject the comparability - obligations of the
§ 504 regulations. See Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F. Supp. 732
(E.D.N.C. 1982).
176. Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982). See University Agrees to Payfor InterpretersforDeaf,
Chronicle of Higher Education, May Ii, 1982, at 2, col. 5 (in response to U.S. Department of
Education threat to cut off funds). Section 504 regulations provide for auxiliary aids, including interpreters, for postsecondary students, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(2) (1982), whereas no
similarly specific provisions apply to elementary/secondary pupils. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3184.39 (1982).
177. The § 504 approach was not eliminated by Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). See supra note 12. See generally Note, Accommodating the Handicapped- RehabilitatingSection 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171 (1980). See
also infra note 189.
178. See Blakely, Judicialand Legislative Attitudes Toward the Right to an Equal Educationfor the Handicapped, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 614-15 (1979).
179. See, e.g., M. YUDOF, D. Kiu', T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY
AND THE LAW 721 (1982); Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 984-89 (1977). The possibility of
greater definitional rigor is also suggested in Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1229
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
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and the then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. 8 0 Other
advantages of section 504 include a broader definition of "handisection 504's funding link 82 and
capped,"'' the broader coverage 18of
3
fees.
attorney's
of
the availability
Bringing a Rowley-type action based on section 504 is not, however, without its problems. Although the predominant weight of judicial authority overwhelmingly favors implying a private right of action
under section 504,' 84 courts have not agreed upon how to resolve other
issues under the statute. Among these issues are: (1) whether such a
suit requires exhaustion of administrative remedies and application of
the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction,8 5 (2) whether this basis is
preempted by the comprehensive statutory scheme of the EAHCA, 8 6
and (3) whether monetary relief is available to individual plaintiffs
under section 504 as an alternative to the remedy of terminating a
180. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 121(a), App. A at 500-01 (1982), citedin Boxall v. Sequoia Union High
School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (Supp. V 1982). See, e.g., Akers v. Bolton, 531 F. Supp. 300, 315
(D. Kan. 1981).
182. As recognized in Rowley, New Mexico is the only state that to date has declined
federal funding under the EAHCA. 102 S.Ct. at 3039 (citing Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 2 n.2). Thus, § 504 was the basis for the suit in New Mexico Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd andremanded,678
F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
183. Section 505 is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. V 1982). See, e.g., Jones v.
Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F.2d 724, 730-31 (7th Cir. 1982); Davis v.
Board of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1215, 1217 (D.D.C. 1982); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd.
of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 57 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
184. Based on such decisions in at least eight circuits and its own decision in an analogous area (Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implied private right of
action under Title IX)), it is very likely that the Supreme Court would find an implied
private right of action under § 504. Various courts and commentators point toward this
conclusion. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 215 (1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 584-85 (D.R.I. 1982); Note, supra note
177, at 180 n.57. But see Hyatt, supra note 174, at 14-23. Incontrast to § 504, the EAHCA
expressly provides a private right of action.
185. For decisions holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to maintaining a judicial action, see Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 215 (1982); New Mexico Ass'n For Retarded Citizens v. New
Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 851 (10th Cir. 1982); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 940-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). For a decision holding that administrative remedies must be sought before
judicial relief can be obtained, see Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047, 1057
(M.D.N.C. 1977). For decisions in which exhaustion of the EAHCA has been required as a
prerequisite to relief under § 504, see Davis v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 542 F.
Supp. 1257, 1263 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F.
Supp. 732, 735-37 (E.D.N.C. 1982); H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215, 221 (D. Md. 1981).
186. See Oberman, supra note 17, at AC7-AC8. Cf. Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577,
585 (D.R.I. 1982) (ruled that § 504 actions must give way to EAHCA proceedings where the
two statutes converge); Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F. Supp. 732, 73437 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (interpreted § 504 in light of EAHCA case law, including Rowley).
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school district's federal funding.' 8 7 Emerging are the overlapping issues of the degree of intent' 88 required and the scope of relief 8 9 available under section 504.
C. Other Approaches
Other legal bases that do not seem as robust or rigorous as the
state statutory and section 504 approaches but nevertheless merit mentioning are section 1983190 and state' 9 ' and federal' 92 constitutional
provisions. Although section 1983 offers possible advantages in terms
of exhaustion, damages, and attorney's fees, at this point "uncertainty
surrounds these generalities"' 9 s because section 1983 may be regarded
as merged into the EAHCA and section 504 as exclusive remedies. The
187. Characterizing the determination of this question as "indeed a 'delphic task'" and
citing the lower courts as being in "hopeless disarray," one district court recently concluded
that Congress intended only declaratory and injunctive relief. See Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin
Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 470-71 (S.D. Tex. 1982). But, as the Ruth Ann M.
decision recognized, a coalescing majority of courts have taken the view that plaintiffs have
a limited right to monetary relief for reimbursement of costs under exceptional circumstances, such as those interpreted under the EAHCA in Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d
1205, 1213-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (serious health risk to child or bad faith by school district). See
Ruth Ann M., 532 F. Supp. at 475. For decisions that have permitted such damages, see
Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 215 (1982);
Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 529 (D.Ha. 1982); Gregg B. v.
Board of Educ., 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1339-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). For decisions that have rejected damages under this view, see Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 553 F. Supp.
787 (M.D. Fla: 1982); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1388-89 (D.R.I. 1982); Reineman v. Valley View Community School Dist. #365-U, 527 F. Supp. 661, 664-65 (N.D. I1.
1981).
188. See, e.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982); Miener v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 980 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 215 (1982); Larry P. v.
Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 1979); New Mexico Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391, 398 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd, 678 F.2d 847, 854 (10th Cir. 1982).
189. For decisions that distinguished and thus avoided the limitation of Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), see S-I v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 34950 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Association For Retarded Citizens v.
Frazier, 517 F. Supp. 105, 121-23 (D. Colo. 1981). But see Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp.
107, 114 (W.D. Va. 1981).
190. The advantages and limitations of this seemingly superfluous basis in relation to the
EAHCA and § 504 are discussed comprehensively in Hyatt, supra note 174, at 24-29.
191. See, e.g., Elliot v. Board of Educ., 64 II. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (1978); In re
G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974). Cf.State v. Stecher, 35 Conn. Sup. 501, 390 A.2d 408
(1977); Scavella v. School Board, 363 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1978) (state special education statutes
construed to conform to constitutional provision for free public education). But cf.Pierce v.
Board of Educ., 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977) (rejected constitutional right to free
special education).
192. See, e.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wisc. 1977); In re G.H., 218
N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974).
193. See Hyatt, supra note 174, at 25.
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primary problem in the constitutional area is traditional abstention 94
in light of the applicable federal statutes. 95 Other nonetheless difficult
problems also are present, including: the limited utility of due process
for quality as compared to access issues, 9 6 the difficulty of establishing
a suspect class for equal protection purposes, 197 and the problem of
formulating a quality
standard under equal protection beyond that of
98
adequacy.
minimal
Other suggestions have included the imposition of burden-shifting
approaches' 99 and the development of national standards. 2" These approaches can, at best, be considered ancillary to the gradual growth of a
multifactor standard of appropriate education.
CONCLUSION

At first reading, the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley seems to
194. For the classic statement of this discretionary doctrine, see Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
195. See, e.g., Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977), vacating and remanding Kruse v.
Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263, 1283 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Abstention would not appear to apply if the Constitution is interpreted as requiring
more than the statutes.
196. For relatively recent examples of the use of due process for access issues, see Howard
S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 636 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (along with
§ 504); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.W.Va. 1976)(along with § 504).
197. Such status is advocated in several sources. See, e.g., Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualfcations ofHandicappedPersonsas a "Suspect Class,"
15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975); Handel, supra note 25; Levine, The Courts, Congress
and EducationalAdequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. 187, 214
(1979). Nevertheless, the vast variety of handicapped persons and the increasingly conservative complexion of the Supreme Court make such a finding unlikely for at least the near
future.
198. Arguments for minimally adequate standards include Dimond, The Constitutional
Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973); Handel, supra note
25. The sub-argument that an inappropriate education is equivalent to functional or constructive exclusion finds some support in equal protection dicta in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 566 (1974) ("rT]here is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the
same facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.") (emphasis added). As such,
this argument may be importable to the language in the Rowley majority opinion about
"meaningful" education. See supra note 112 and text accompanying notes 118-19.
Rodriguez expressed several barriers, including the need for discoverable and manageable standards, the lack of scholarly consensus about the needs-outcomes relationship,
and the "double disappointment" of not finding education to be a fundamental right. See
Note, The Education of All HandicappedChildren Act of 1975, 10 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 110,
132-35 (1976). There seems to be some mitigation of the last hurdle in Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.
Ct. 2382, 2397-98 (1982).
199. See, e.g., Handel supra note 25, at 374; Note, Self Sufficiency Under the Educationfor
All Handicapped Children Act: A Suggested JudicialApproach, 1981 DUKE L.J. 516, 533.
200. See, e.g., Note, supra note 199, at 518. See also supra note 171.
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sound a dramatic retreat, if not all-out defeat, for the advocates of
handicapped students. Upon closer examination, however, the majority's opinion provides the elements for the common-law evolution of a
multifactor test for determining the meaning of "appropriate education." This test might include such factors as the nature and severity of
the handicap, the level of local resources and results, and the evaluations by educational experts and - upon judicial review - by the impartial hearing officer.
Thus, rather than ignoring the rights of handicapped children, in
crafting a narrow and ambiguous decision the Court provided room for
full and timely interpretation. An agenda-setting2 0 case like Rodriguez, Rowley invites immediate experimentation and variation at the
state level, based primarily on state special education statutes. It also
allows eventual expansion and consolidation at the federal level by legislative, administrative, or judicial action.20 2
201. Cf. Rebel, supra note 8, at 344 ("The goal of assuring 'appropriate education,' like
the goal in other contexts of providing 'equal opportunity,' provides no concrete benchmark
for assessing progress. Rather, it provides a 'stimulus' around which those having a stake in
social policy processes can 'carry on politics' by another means.") (footnote omitted).
202. Cf.Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960) ("This conclusion may
not satisfy an academic desire for tidiness, symmetry and precision in this area . .

.

. If

there is fear of undue uncertainty or overmuch litigation, Congress may make more precise
its treatment of the matter by singling out certain factors and making them determinative of
the matter.").

